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"AND OTHER MINERALS"
AS INTERPRETED BY THE
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
ROBERT E. BECK*
Since Adams County v. Smith' was decided in 1946, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has dealt with the phrase "and other min-
erals" or a variant thereof in six different cases. 2 This article ex-
plores the court's approach to the phrase in Adams County and the
six subsequent opinions in an effort to determine what the .phrase
means, with a special focus on whether or not and when coal is
included. Only five of the seven cases involved coal; 3 another in-
volved uranium, 4 and the remaining case involved gravel.5 Under
some circumstances coal has been included; under other circum-
stances coal has not been included. What makes the difference?
Three of the cases interpret the phrase as statutory language;0
two of the cases involve the language as part of a "reservation or
exception; " 7 one of the cases involves the language in a- grant;8
and in one it is contained in a lease.9 The immediate question arises
whether these contexts make any difference in interpreting the lan-
guage and whether they ought to.
' Professor of Law, University of North Dakota, School of Law; LL.B., 1960, University
of Minnesota; LL.M., 1966, New York University.
1. 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946).
2. MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 56 (N.D. 1957) ; Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d
502 (N.D. 1959) ; Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972) ; Christman v. Emineth, 212
N.W.2d 343 (N.D. 1973) ; Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1975) ; Reiss v. Rum-
mel, 232 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1975).
Other variations can be found in North Dakota cases that did not involve any issue
as to the Interpretation of the language. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753,
754 (N.D. 1971) ("All oil, gas, uranium and all other minerals"): Convis v. State, 104
N.W.2d 1, 3 (N.D. 1960) ("all coal, oil, natural gas and other minerals").
While not all cases involving this phrase involve a mineral severance Or potential
severance, many cases do. For a recent' discussion of North Dakota severed mineral in-
terests, see Fleck, Severed Mincral Interests, 51 N.D.L. Ray. 369 (1974).
3. Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.V.2d 873 (1946) ; Abbey v. State, 202
N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972) ; Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.V.2d 343 (N.D. 1973) ; Olson v.
Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1975) ; Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1975).
4. MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 56 (N.D. 1957).
5. Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959).
6. Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946) ; Salzseider v. Bruns-
dale, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959) ; Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972).
7. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 343 (N.D. 1973) ; Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d
363 (N.D. 1975).
8. Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1975).
9. MacMaster v. Onstad. 86 N.W.2d 56 (N.D. 1957).
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I. THE CASES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER
A. Adams County v. Smith.' 0
In 1941, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly passed a law
stating in part that in county land transfers "there shall be reserved
to such county transferring such land fifty percent (50%) of all oil,
natural gas, and/or mineral which may be found on or underlying
such land."" The scope of a land transfer by a county subsequent
to this statute was at issue in this case. Although the court concluded
that the type of land transfer involved the case, a tax deed, is not
subject to this statute, it also decided the issue whether "mineral"
included coal. Had the court asked and answered first the question
whether the statute applied to the, type of transfer involved, it would
not 'have reached the coal issue; instead it asked first whether coal
was included and preceeded to the question -of applicability of the
statute only after determining that coal was included.
What is learned from the court's opinion about the meaning of
"mineral" in this statute? The court stated that the term is not sus-
ceptible of a rigid definition but rather its definition depends upon
the intent with which it is used. The court then pointed out that
the North Dakota Legislative Assembly had previously indicated that
it considered coal to be a mineral and noted that the assembly
10. 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946).
11. 1941 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 136, § 1. This language was repealed by 1951 N.D. Seas.
Laws ch. 112, § 1. The history of the section follows.
The first indication of a mineral reservation by a county upon transfer of county land
occurs in 1937 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 123, § 1 when the board of county commissioners is
given authority so that it "may on sale of any land reserve to the County all or any part
of the oil, gas, coal and/or mineral rights therein." Then on March 14, 1941, the Act in-
volved in the Adams Cunty case became effective which required the reservation of fifty
percent of "all oil, natural gas, and/or mineral which may be found on or underlying such
land." [Apparently the "s" was inadvertently omitted after the word "mineral."] Note
that coal is not mentioned specifically although it had been in the 1937 law. Apparently
this law was to be read in conjunction with the 1937 law in such a way that the board
of county commissioners could reserve all of the mineral rights but had to reserve at least
fifty percent. That is the Interpretation codified into the 1943 Code. Furthermore, the singu-
lar "mineral" is turned into the plural "minerals." N.D. REV. CODE § 11-2704 (1943).
Then In 1946 came the Adams County case. Effective February 26, 1949, the legislative
assembly approved a law allowing the county to make a transfer to the United States,
Its agencies or agents free of the mineral reservation. Power was also given to release
previous reservations. These provisions remain codified as N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 11-27-04.1
and 11-27-04.2 (1960). Then in 1951 the basic 1941 law was repealed by means of a Legis-
lative Research Committee bill. 1951 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 112, § 1. The only comment in
the LRC report about the bill is as follows:
This section has been held to be ineffective on purely technical grounds be-
cause of conflict with other sections. Such difficulty could be resolved and
the practical consideration as to whether the reservation should be made is
of more importance.
Rep. N.D. Leg. Res. Comm. 22 (1951). The conflict referred to was with the specific code
provisions on how tax forfeited lands were to be disposed of. The Court in Adams County
and subsequent cases held that this reservation provision did not apply to tax forfeited
lands. See Kershaw v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 932, 47 N.W.2d 132 (1951); Kopplin v.
Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 942, 47 N.WV.2d 137 (1951) : State v. California Co., 56 N.W.2d
762 (N.D. 1953); Steen v. Fay, 66 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1954). However, the statute could
have had force and effect as to disposition of county lands other than those acquired
through tax forfeiture.
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was aware of that at the time it passed the 1941 law. After next
noting that all cases that have had to decide whether coal is a min-
eral have held it to be a mineral, the court concluded that coal is
included within the term mineral as used in this statute.
It is of importance that the court did not rely exclusively on
the mere fact that coal commonly is considered a mineral. It spe-
cifically referred to the legislative assembly's earlier use of mineral
to include coal and its contemporaneous knowledge of this earlier
use as significant. Yet while it seemed to recognize the point that
"emineral" may or may not include coal depending on legislative in-
tent, a reader of the case gets a strong impression that the court
did not apply that approach. Rather it appears to have applied a
more simplistic approach. Coal is a mineral. This statutes applies
to minerals. Therefore this statute applies to coal.
Perhaps interpretations that favor public ownership of an impor-
tant resource should be favored policy; in that context this decision
could be supported. It is difficult to support on the limited analy-
sis that the court gave to the question.
B. Mac Master v. Onstad2
Mac Master involved the interpretation of a lease executed in
1956 containing the following language, "oil, gas, casinghead gas,
casinghead gasoline, and all other minerals.' 1 3 The specific ques-
tion was whether or not uranium was included within "other min-
erals." The trial court held it was not included on the basis of ejus-
dem generis, that this was an oil and gas lease and the phrase
"other minerals" should be interpreted in that context and uranium
had nothing to do with oil and gas. While, affirming the conclusion
that uranium was not included, the North Dakota Supreme Court
rejected the trial court's ejusdem generis reasoning and supported
the conclusion instead on the basis of the 1955 law which stated that
a lease did not convey "gravel, coal, clay or uranium unless the
intent to convey such interest is specifically and separately set forth
in the instrument. ' 1 4 The court found that no intent to convey uran-
ium had been specifically and separately set forth.
12. 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957).
13. Id. at 39.
14. 1955 N.D. Sess. Laws c. 235, § 1. The fu1l text of the 1955 law was as follows:
No lease or conveyance of mineral rights or royalties separate from the
surface rights in real property in this state shall be construed to grant or
convey to the grantee thereof any interest in and to any gravel, coal, clay
or uranium unless the intent to convey such interest is specifically and sepa-
rately set forth in the Instrument of lease or conveyance.
Id. It was codified as N.D. REv. CODE § 47-1024 (1957 Supp.). In 1957 a law was passed
that dealt separately with leases and conveyances. The portion dealing with leases
read as follows:
No lease of mineral rights in this state shall be construed as passing any in-
terest to any minerals except those minerals specifically included and set
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The question arises whether this statutory provision could ever
be satisfied without the word "coal" or "uranium" or "gravel" or
"clay," or a recognized synonym, actually appearing somewhere in
the document. Mac Master appears to say that such specification
is required.
What then do we learn about coal as an "other mineral" from
this uranium lease case? The 1955 law, which became effective
July 1, 1955, applied equally to coal and there appears to be no rea-
son why a court should distinguish coal from uranium for this pur-
pose. Thus, leases executed after July 1, 1955, must refer to "coal"
or some recognized equivalent, such as perhaps "lignite," in order
to transfer any interest in coal.
Ejusdem generis is rejected on the facts of this case as a con-
cept for interpreting "other minerals." It appears necessary to em-
phasize the facts of this case because of the court's analysis of the
concept. The trial judge had held that the lease included only those
minerals that could be produced in connection with and as an inci-
dent to the production of oil and gas through means of a well.
A primary reason for rejecting this interpretation, even though
the document was titled, "Oil and Gas Lease," appears to be that
the lease specifically contemplated the production of sulphur by speci-
fying a 50 cent per ton royalty and the production of other miner-
als by specifying a 1/10th royalty. 5 Not all sulphur is produced
from wells. The royalty on oil and gas was 121/2 percent. In further
support of its decision to reject the ejusdem generis approach, the
court stated:
forth by name In the lease. For the purposes of this paragraph any mineral
so named shall be deemed to include the by-products of such mineral and in
the case of oil and gas, all associated hydrocarbons' produced in a liquid or
gasedus form so named shall be deemed to be included in the mineral named.
The use of the words "all other minerals" or similar words of an all-inclusive
nature in any lease shall not be construed as leasing any minerals except
those minerals or their by products set forth 'n the !ease.
1957 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 245, § 1. The law remained in that form until 1969 when it was
amended to read as follows:
No lease of mineral rights In this state shall be construed as passing any
interest to any minerals except those minerals specifically included and set
forth by name In.the lease. For the purposes of this paragraph the naming
of either a specific metalliferous element, and if so stated in lease, shall be
deemed to Include all of its compounds and byproducts, and in the case of oil
and gas, all associated hydrocarbons produced in a liquid, or gaseous form so
named shall be deemed to be included in the mineral named. The use of the
words "all other minerals" or similar words of an all-inclusive nature in
any lease shall not be construed as leasing any minerals except those min-
erals specifically named in the lease and their compounds and byproducts.
1969 Sess. Laws Ch. 403, § 1. It remains codified as N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (Supp.
1975).
15. The clause read as follows:
4th. To pay or deliver to lessor, on all other minerals mined and marketed,
one-tenth either in kind or value at the well or mine, at lessee's election,
except that on sulphur the royalty shall be fifty cents (50 cents) per. long ton.
86 N.W.2d at 40, (EmPhasis added). The court said this paragraph was "of most in.
portant significance." Id. at 41.
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We do think there is significance in the fact the lease author-
ized the lessee to produce not simply oil and gas and other
minerals but oil and gas and all other minerals. No word is
more inclusive than "all"....16
This meant all other minerals, not just those associated with, oil and
gas in some way. What the court was purporting to do was to find
the intent of the parties. What did they intend when they used the
phrase "other minerals?" Thus just as the court recognized legis-
lative intent as crucial to interpreting the phrase in the Adams
County case, so here it recognized the intent of the parties to the
lease as crucial to its interpretation. This is consistent with the ob-
servation in Adams County that the word mineral does not have a
fixed meaning. In this case the inclusion of sulphur and the use of
the word "all" in the context of "all other minerals" played a key
role in establishing intent.
The court also rejected "hydrocarbons" as a class for applying
ejusdem generis since sulfur was specifically mentioned in the lease
and is not a hydrocarbon. But the court made it clear for the first
time that the word mineral is not to be interpreted so broadly as
to include everything that is not animal or vegetable on the basis
of the common animal-vegetable-mineral classification. The court ci-
ted favorably cases where gravel, limestone, and sand were held
not within the word mineral either because they were "a part of
the soil"'17 or because mining of them would "destroy the surface." 18
The court conculded:
It is thus clear that it would be not only impractical, but
impossible to attempt to catalogue all the minerals which. are,
and which are not, included in the grant in the lease under
consideration. Decision as to whether any specific mineral
is included in the lease must await a case in which an issue
as to that mineral is raised. 19
This reasoning would seem most appropriate for interpreting
whether coal is included in leases executed before July 1, 1955, when
the statute involved in Mac Master became effective.
16. Id. at 41. (Emphasis added).
17. Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384 (1954); Psencik v. Wessels,
205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
18. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949) ; Eldridge v. Edmonson, 252
S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
19. 86 N.W.2d at 43. In Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil and G. Co., 251
F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958), the federal court dealt with essentially the same lease form as
that Involved in MacIllaster, the difference in the two cases being that the lease in this
case was executed before the effective date of the 1955 statute requiring specification of coal,
uranium, gravel, and sand. The court held that based on Maclaster the trial judge was
correct in denying plaintiff's request that "other minerals" be limited. to those that are
produced through a well as an incident of oil and gas production. The court did not make
a specific determination as to what constitutes "minerals."
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C. Salzseider v. Brunsdale.20
This case involved the interpretation of a contract for deed from
the state which contained a reservation of "fifty (50%) percent of all
oil, natural gas, or minerals. '"2 1 1 The reservation was included pur-
suant to a state statute first enacted in 1939 requiring such a reser-
vation. The court concluded that since what the deed language in-
tended to accomplish was the statutory requirement, this was real-
ly a statutory interpretation case. The statute provided for a reser-
vation of "fifty percent of all oil, natural gas, or minerals... "22
The specific question was whether gravel had been reserved to the
state. Despite what might have been interpreted as a policy of favo-
ring governmental ownership in the Adams County case, the court
chose not to extend it. This statutory reference to "minerals" in con-
nection with state lands would not include gravel whereas the one
relating to county lands in Adams County would include coal. What
distinguished the two? In Salzseider, as in Adams County, the court
emphasized legislative intent as the key to interpretation, while re-
iterating its Mac Master conclusion that they can adopt neither an
20. 94 N.W.28 502 (N.D. 1959).
21. Id. at 503.
22. 1949 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 149, § 1. It became effective March 13, 1939, as an emer-
gency measure. Id. § 2. The full text read as follows:
In all transfers of land hereafter made by the State of North Dakota or any
of the State departments or lands now owned by the State of North Dakota
or which may hereafter be acquired by the State of North Dakota, or any of
its departments by deed, quit claim deed, foreclosure or by any other method,
and whether such transfers made by the State of North Dakota or any of its
departments are made by deed, contract Or lease, there shall be reserved to
the State of North Daokta five per cent (5%) of all rights to any oil, natural
gas or minerals which may be found on or underlying such land. Any trans-
fer, deed or lease which does not contain such reservation shall be null and
void and of no effect.
Id. § 1. The law was amendbd in 1941 to substitute "fifty (50%) per cent of all oil, natural
gas or minerals" for "five per cent (5%) of all rights to any oil, natural gas or miner-
als" and to provide that "any transfer, deed or lease which does not contain such reser-
vation shall be construed as if such reservation were contained therein." 1941 N.D. Sess.
Laws ch. 165 § 1. This became effective as an emergency measure on February 20, 1941.
Id. § 2. In 1943 these two laws were codified as follows:
In every transfer of land, whether by deed, contract, leise, or otherwise, by
the state of North Dakota, or by any department thereof, fifty percent of all
oil, natural gas, or minerals which may be founcd on or undrlying such land
shall be reserved to the state of North Dakota. Any deed, contract, lease,
or other transfer of any such land made after February 20, 1941, which does
not contain such reservation shall be construed as if such reservation were
contained therein. The provisions of this section shall apply to all lands
owned by this state or by any department thereof regardless of how title
thereto was acquired.
N.D. REV. CODE § 38-0901 (1943). It now appears as N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-09-01 (1972).
However in 1949 the lezislative assembly provided that land could be transferred free of
this reservation to the United States or its agencies or agents. 1949 N.D. Sess. Laws ch.
311, § 1. N.D. CENT. COnE § 38-09-01.1 (1972). It further provided that prior reservations
could be released. 1949 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 311, § 2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-09-01.2 (1972).
In 1951 the legislative assembly provided that land would be transferred free of this res-
ervation when it was sold "to any person, from whom the state derived the title to such
lands, or to his spouse or to his lineal descendants in the first degree." 1951 N.D. Sess.
LaLws ch. 231, § 1; N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-09-01.3 (1972). A corrollary provision providing
for a release of previous reservations in favor of similar persons was held unconstitutional
in Solberg v. State Treasurer, 53 N.'W.2d 49 (N.D. 1952), as a violation of N.D. CONST.
§ 185 prohibiting donations by the State in aid of individuals.
AND OTHER MINERALS 639
animal-vegetable-mineral approach nor a hydrocarbon, non-hydrocar-
bon approach, since one would include the soil itself and the other
would exclude oil, gas, and coal.
Again, as in Mac Master, the court cited cases from other jur-
isdictions and noted that in most of them sand and gravel were con-
sidered not to be in the "ordinary and natural meaning" or trade
understanding 'of mineral. - Cases are again referred to that exclude
sand and gravel because their extraction would destroy the surface
or because they are indistinguishable from the soil in general. Hav-
ing concluded that the legislative assembly intended to adopt the
ordinary understanding of minerals as used in conveyances and wills,
the court further concluded that gravel was not within the term.
D. Abbey v. State.24
A patent from the state in plaintiff's predecessor in 1948 reserved
"all rights and privileges vested in the State of North Dakota
under the provisions of the constitution and laws of said state." 25
At that time the North Dakota law provided for a reservation in
every transfer of land of "fifty percent of all oil, natural gas, or
minerals. ' ' 2 6 The questions were (1) whether the patent language
constituted a sufficient reference of the reservation and (2) whether
it included coal. The court answered both questions yes.
In the course of its opinion the court stated:
[Mrs. Abbey] contends that whether coal is a mineral is a
question of fact and not a question of law and that, there-
fore, evidence is required to establish that fact. With this
contention we do not agree.2 7
What appears to be confusing here is the point, not that a factual
question is involved, but rather that one of intent is involved. Coal
may be a mineral, but did the legislature intend to include coal
when it used the word mineral in this statute? Do private parties
intend to include coal when they use the word mineral in a convey-
23. 94 N.W.2d at 504.
24. 202 N.V.2d 844 (N.D. 1972). The Abbey holding was approved without further dis-
cussion in Haag v. State, 219 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1974).
25. Id. at S55.
26. N.D. REV. CODE § 30-0901 (1943.) The history of this provision Is discussed In note
22, supra. Until amended in 1960, the North Dakota Constitution prohibited the sale of
those of the lands granted to North Dakota from the United' States for common school
support that constituted "coal lands." N.D. CONST. § 155. The question arose whether
the fifty percent reservation requirement applied to those lands that turned out to be coal
lands but which were disposed of hefore that condition was known. In Permann v. Knife
River Coal Mining Co., 180 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1970), the court held that it did not. In
Haag v. State, 219 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1974), the court overruled Permann and held that
it did apply. The constitution now provides with reference to these common school lands
that on the sale of any such lands all minerals, "including but not limited to oil, gas,
coal, cement materials, sodium sulphate, sand and gravel, road material, building stone,
chemical substances, metallic ores, uranium ores, or colloidal or other c0ays," be reserx,,I
and excepted on behalf of the State, N.D. CONST. § 155.
27. 202 N.W.2d at 855.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ance? That intent is the key was established in the three previous
cases discussed in this article. The court quoted at length from the
Adams County case, including the language about legislative intent,
and then concluded: "Applying that reasoning to the instant case,
we conclude . . . that the word 'minerals' include coal.1 2 Since
the legislative assembly had made a major amendment to the stat-
ute in 1941, the same year it adopted the law involved in Adams
County, it could be argued that the court's conclusion about legisla-
tive intent in Adams County applied 'equally to the instant case; It
would have been better, however, had the court recognized that this
statute was enacted first in 1939 and reached a conclusion as to leg-
islative intent at the time.
The court does not mention the Salzseider opinion where it had
dealt with the statute here in question, although on a problem in-
volving gravel. Again the court specifically rejected the organic/in-
organic approach to defining mineral.
E. Christman v. Emineth.29
In Christman the court had to interpret language in a 1943 deed
excepting and reserving "fifty percent of all right and title in and
to any and all oil, gas and other mineral's in or under the forego-
ing described land."3 0 The court concluded that this language sev-
ered fifty percent of the coal. This was the first case in which the
court interpreted the language in the context of a deed between pri-
vate parties, and the court wrote an extensive opinion dealing with
several arguments.
First, the court reiterated some conclusions reached in the non-
deed cases, that whether lignite coal is a mineral is not a fact ques-
tion, 1 that lignite is a mineral,3 2 and that mineral is not to be in-
terpreted on the basis of the animal-velgetable-mineral distinction. 33
The court then noted that grants, being contracts, are to be interpre-
ted "to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties, ' 34 so again
intent was emmphasized as in all of the previous cases. The court
then turned to a discussion of the intent of the parties. It rejected
the ejusdem generis argument because while there may be some
dissimilarities between oil and gas on the one hand and coal on
the other hand, such as liquid versus solid, it felt that there prob-
'ably were more similarities, such as hydrocarbon composition. The
28. Id. at 856.
29. 212 Nl.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
30. Id. at 546.
31. Id. at 548, citing Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972).
32. 212 N.W.2d at 549, quoting Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873
(1946).
33. 212 N.W.2d at 549, quoting Salzselder v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959).
34. 212 N.W.2d at 549, quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-09-11 (1960) and 9-07-03 (1975).
AND OTHER MINERALS
court then asked what was to be the basis for the ejusdem generis
distinction. It failed entirely to analyze the case on the basis of the
distinction raised in Mac Master although rejected therein as inap-
plicable. This was that "other minerals" should be interpreted to
refer to those associated with oil and gas production through well
extraction. That argument was rejected in Mac Master because the
lease there specifically provided for a separate royalty for sulphur
and other minerals, a situation that did not exist here. The reason
that lead to the rejection -of this ejusdem generis argument in Mac
Master simply was not present in Christman.
The -second argument as to the intent of the parties rejected by
the court was that coal would have to be developed through sur-
face mining leading to a destruction of the surface and it would ap-
pear unlikely that the parties intended the grantor be able to des-
troy the surface that he had conveyed to the grantee knowing it
was to be used for agricultural purposes. The court gave no direct
response to this powerful argument. Instead it said that the North
Dakota Legislative Assembly had enacted a reclamation law de-
signed to prevent destruction of the surface. What bearing does a 1969
statute have on the intent of the parties to a 1943 instrument of con-
veyance? None, unless they divined in 1943 that the legislative as-
sembly would some day pass such a law. The court also interpre-
ted the instrument which read "all oil, gas and other minerals" as
being the same as "oil, gas . . . and all other minerals" intrepre-
ted in Mac Master and then merely quoted Mac Master as to how
inclusive the use of the word "all" is. However, the court gave no
authority for this reading. It was reasonable to conclude in Mac
Master that as used therein "all" meant "every kind." However,
that intrepretation does not hold for Christman' It is entirely pos-
sible that the word "all" as used in Christman meant "100%" in-
stead of "every kind." It is silly to read into Christman "every
kind of oil." It makes sense to read into it "100%" of the oil, 100%
of the gas, and 100% of the other minerals that are included with
the oil and gas." That is, the parties were reserving 50% of 100%
and not 50% of 50%, a type of problem the court had to deal with
in an-other recent case.3 5 The use of the word "all" then had no
bearing on what kind of minerals were being reserved, only on the
amount of minerals being reserved.
An ejusdem generis intrepretation would be consistent with the
developing modern approach to the respective interests of severed
and surface estates, that of equal status.3 6 'It could be based either
35. Kadiras v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971).
36. See Patton, Recent Changes in 'the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners,
18 ROCKY MT. MIN. LAW INST. 19 (1973) :
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on those minerals associated with -oil and gas production, as argu-
ed but rejected in Mac Master, or those minerals usually found with
or associated with oil and gas formations. This approach would give
meaningful effect to all the language used and would not go to either
extreme.
The court's opinion, however, would appear to be consistent with
the following North Dakota Century Code provision:
A grant shall be interpreted in favor of the grantee, ex-
cept that a reservation in any grant, and every grant by a
public officer or body, as such, to a private party, is to be
interpreted in favor of the grantor.3 7
However, the court did not refer to this provision as a basis for
its decision. The presence of this code provision seems to leave no
room for the standard rule of construction that a document is to be
construed most strongly against the person who drafted it unless the
drafter is the grantor.
Despite the court's rejection of these arguments as to intent,
it remains important that the court recognized intent of the par-
ties as the focal point in interpreting "other minerals." The con-
clusion that coal is included does not occur automatically but only
after an analysis of intent. A case may arise wherein the court will
say: "On the facts of this case, the parties did not intend to include
coal when they used the phrase 'other minerals.'
F. Olson v. Dilllerud.38
In this case the court dealt with a reservation and exception
contained in a 1954 transfer wherein there was reserved "100%
of all right and title in and to any and all oil, gas and other min-
erals in or under the foregoing described land."3 9 The court con-
cluded that this case could not be distinguished from Christman and
that on the basis of that case they would conclude that "other min-
erals" as used in this transfer included coal. The court considered
There have been a number of Judlc'al decisions In several jurisdictions in
the past few years dealing with the correlative rights of the owners of the
surface and the severed mineral estate in a given tract of land, the general
trend of which has been to cut back on the rights of the mineral estate in favor
of the surface owner. These cases have fallen into two general categories,
one group holding that a grant or reservation of -oil, gas and other minerals"
does not convey or reserve a particular mineral substance and the other group
generally holding that certain activities of the mineral owner in attempting to
produce his minerals constitute an unreasonable use of the surface estate and
cannot be engaged in, at least not without compensation being paid to the
surface owner.
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-13 (1960). The only case discussed in this article that re-
ferred to this provision was Salzselder v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959), and In
that case 'the court found the provision inapplicable.
38. 266 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1975).
39. Id. at 965.
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and rejected two possible distinctions. First it was argued that
the parties could not have intended coal to be severed since it in-
volved farm land and the coal owner would have the power to de-
stroy the surface through strip mining. The court noted that Christ-
man involved farmland as well but then proceeded to qualify its
Christman holding to make it clear that a mineral owner does not
have the power to "destroy" the surface as contrasted with the pow-
er to "use" the surface.40 The second argument centered around
whether coal was a known resource, the attempt being to distinguish
Christman on the basis that it relied on the knowledge of the exis-
tence of coal as indicative of an intent to include it when it was not
specifically excluded. Here there was no evidence of such knowleldge.
The court said it was not going to speculate about whether coal was
known or unkown. This suggests that one, who challenges the in-
clusion of coal has the burden of showing that coal was unknown;
showing a negative is often more difficult than showing a positive.
Perhaps the burden should be the other way. Regardless, the prop-
er interpretation of Christman would appear to be that knowledge
of the existence of strip mining of coal was relied upon as evidence
that the parties contemplated strip mining, it having already been
determined through other means that the parties intended to include
coal.
G. Reiss v. Rummel.41
This case involved a 1967 conveyance of a 15/480 interest in "all
the oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline and other miner-
als. ' 42 The specific question asked was whether this language in-
cluded coal and uranium. The answer given was that it did not. The
conveyance failed to meet the dictates of the North Dakota law which
provides that coal, uranium, gravel, and clay will not pass, by con-
veyance "unless the intent to convey such interest is specifically
and separately set forth in the instrument.- 43 The trial court had
held that the use of the word minerals satisfied this requirement,
but the supreme court specifically rejected that approach.
The court went on to state that an exception or reservation would
not constitute a conveyance, and, therefore, this section would not
apply to exceptions and reservations.
Since the court in Christman had held unconstitutional the speci-
40. Id. at 367.
41. 232 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1975).
42. Id. at 41.
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (1960). The 1955 origins of this law are discussed In
note 14, supra. The basic language as to conveyance was not changed in 1955 when the
legislative assembly crested separate provisions on conveyances and leases. 1955 N.D. Sess.
Ltaws ch. 245, § 1. No change occurred in this portion as a result of the 1969 amendments
either. 1969 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 403, § 1.
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fic code provisions dealing with description of minerals in excep-
tions and reservations and since that decision was applied retroac-
tively in Olson, there then existed no guides on the statute books as
to interpreting non-governmental reservations and exceptions involv-
ing "other minerals." The 1975 legislative assembly remedied this
gap in the law with the following statute:
In any deed, grant, or conveyance of the title to the surface
of real property executed after the effective date of this Act,
in which all or any portion 'of the minerals are reserved or ex-
cepted from being transferred with the surface, the use of
the word "minerals" or the phrase "all other minerals" or
similar words or phrases of an all-inclusive nature shall be in-
terpreted to mean only those minerals specifically named in
the deed, grant, or conveyance and their compounds and by-
products."
Reading of Reiss as to conveyances, MacMaster as to leases, and
Christman as to exceptions and reservations suggests that since
July 1, 1955, in order to transfer coal rights by conveyance or lease
there had to be specific reference to or use of the word "coal" or some
functional equivalent such as "lignite," but no such requirement ex-
isted as to -exceptions and reservations until July 1, 1975, when the
new law took effect.
A difference exists among the three provisions, however. The
lease and exception and reservation provisions have reference to the
inclusion of compounds and byproducts. The conveyance provision
has no such reference.
II. THE CASES AS A COMPOSITE
What is learned from these cases as to the interpretation of the
phrase "and other minerals" 'as it related to coal? Several basic
points seem very clear.
First, no matter where the language appears it is to be inter-
preted according to the intent of the user whether a legislative assem-
bly in a statute or private parties to a binding document. There is
no automatic interpretation as to the scope of the phrase, so no auto-
matic inclusion or exclusion of coal.
Second, unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed, the courts
will not interpret the phrase so broadly as to distinguish it in the ani-
mal-vegetable-mineral context. Limiting factors include whether the
product is separate from the soil and whether it can be removed
without destruction of the surface. After having first indicated that
44. 1975 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 422, § 1.
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coal would constitute an exception to the destructibilitly limit,4 5 the
court later backtracked some by indicating that a subsurface coal
owner would not be allowed to destroy the surface. 46 It is not clear
whether it will simply be a limit on coal owners, or whether it will
also be used as an element in determining whether coal is included
in the phrase "and other minerals."
This limitation will however, be very important in another con-
text. The North Dakota Public Service Commission has been given
the power to deny coal mining permits if it finds that the surface land
there involved could not be reclaimed.4 7 A subsurface coal owner
who owns nothing but coal might argue that his coal has been con-
fiscated if he is not allowed to mine it. However, if he has no right to
destroy the surface in the first place, the Public Service Commission
will have prevented him from doing nothing that he had any right to
do in the first place. Furthermore, counties are given the power to
zone to conserve natural resources.48 If a county zones an agricultural
zone and thereby prevents severed coal owners from mining their
coal, they too might argue that preventing them from using the only
thing they own constitutes confiscation. However, if the basis for the
county zoning is the conservation of the soil, certainly a natural re-
source and necessary to the economic base of the community, and if
it has not been demonstrated that reclamation is feasible and there
is, therefore, great danger that the surface will be destroyed, it would
seem that the county action should be upheld since it prevents the coal
owner from doing nothing that he has any right to do in the first place.
At present it certainly is a rational argument that the feasibility of
reclamation has not been proved.4 1 Otherwise why are millions of
dollars currently being spent in North Dakota by so many different
agencies and companies?
Third, from July 1, 1955, onward, in order for nongovernmental
leases and conveyances to transfer an interest in coal, there must be
specific and special reference to it in the lease or conveyance. "And
other minerals" will not suffice. This is true for exceptions and re-
servations from July 1, 1975, onward.
45. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 343 (N.D. 1973).
46. Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1975).
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14-05.1(2) (Supp. 1975).
48. N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-33-03(5) (1960).49. See Dietrich, An Historical Overview of Strip Mine Reclamation in North Dakota,
in SOME ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF STRIP MINING IN NORTH DAKOTA 49 (Wali ed. 1973);
Vali & Freeman, Ecoloqy of Some Mined Areas in North Dakota, In SOME ENVIRON-
MENTAL ASPECTS OF STRIP MINING IN NORTH DAKOTA 25 (Wall ed. 1973) ; Sandoval, Bond,
Power & Willis, Lignite Mine Spoils in the Northern Great Plains-Characteristics and
Potential for Reclamation, in SOME ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF STRIP MINING IN NORTH
DAKOTA 1 (Walli ed. 1973).

